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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Charles Farrior, DAU 
Outsourcing the Procurement/Acquisition Function of an Operation: Is It a 
Good Thing or Not? 
Debbie Nicholson, J. M. Waller Associates, Inc. 
Jeffrey P. Parsons—Executive Director of the U.S. Army Contracting Command (a new major 
subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command, AMC). The Army Contracting Command 
provides global contracting support to the operational Army across the full spectrum of military 
operations and in garrison. Mr. Parsons commands over 5,500 military and civilian personnel 
worldwide, who award and manage over 270,000 contractual actions valued at more than $80 billion 
per fiscal year. He exercises command and procurement authority over two subordinate commands, 
the Installation Contracting Command and the Expeditionary Contracting Command, and also leads 
the AMC Acquisition Centers, which support AMC’s other major subordinate commands and Life 
Cycle Management Commands. Mr. Parsons was appointed to the Senior Executive Service on 
December 15, 2003. 
Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Parsons served as the Director of Contracting, Office of 
Command Contracting, Headquarters, AMC, Fort Belvoir, VA. Responsibilities from the Office of 
Command Contracting transitioned into the Army Contracting Command. Mr. Parsons continues to 
serve as the Principal Advisor to the Commanding General of AMC and his staff on all contracting 
matters and as the AMC Career Program Manager for the Contracting and Acquisition Career 
Program, with responsibility for the recruitment, training, education, and professional development of 
the civilian and military contracting professionals who are part of the acquisition workforce.  
Prior to his appointment to the Senior Executive Service, Mr. Parsons was the Director of Contracting, 
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, where he 
retired from active duty as an Air Force Colonel after 26 years of service. He was responsible for 
developing and implementing contracting policies and processes to annually acquire $34 billion in 
research and development, production, test, and logistics support for Air Force weapon systems. He 
was directly responsible for the training, organizing, and equipping of more than 3,000 contracting 
professionals. 
Mr. Parsons’ contracting career began in 1977 as a base procurement officer supporting the 90th 
Strategic Missile Wing at F. E. Warren Air Force Base, WY. He held a variety of positions as a 
contracting officer with a wide range of experience touching on all aspects of systems, logistics, and 
operational contracting. He was the Director of Contracting for a multi-billion dollar classified satellite 
program operated by the National Reconnaissance Office and served twice as a plant commander in 
the Defense Contract Management Agency. Mr. Parsons also held several key staff positions at 
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Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, the Air Force Secretariat, and with the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, in which he was responsible for the development, implementation, and management of 
integrated, coordinated, and uniform policies and programs to govern DoD procurement worldwide.  
Mr. Parsons received his bachelor’s degree in psychology from St. Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, 
PA, and holds two master’s degrees—one in administration with a concentration in procurement and 
contracting from George Washington University, Washington, DC, and the other in national resource 
strategy from the National Defense University. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces and the Defense Systems Management College Executive Program Management Course. Mr. 
Parsons holds the Acquisition Professional Development Program’s highest certifications in 
contracting and program management. He also is a Certified Professional Contracts Manager, 
National Contract Management Association. 
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Determining the Appropriate Size of the Contracting 
Workforce: Yes We Can! 
Tim Reed—Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Reed teaches master's courses in 
acquisition management. He also taught at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), where he 
created the Strategic Purchasing Graduate Degree Program, the University of Dayton, American 
University (Washington, DC), and the University of Maryland (University College). He has also taught 
visiting seminars at American University in Cairo and Instituto de Empresas in Madrid. His Air Force 
contracting experience includes F-22 Fighter, C-17 Cargo Transport, and serving as director of Joint 
Contracting Command-North, Kirkuk, Iraq. At the Pentagon, Dr. Reed was responsible for 
implementing strategic sourcing and commodity councils for the DoD and the Air Force. He earned a 
PhD in Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship from the University of Colorado and is a certified 
purchasing manager (C.P.M.) with the Institute of Supply Management. [tsreed@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
The increasing pace of change in the federal acquisition environment, an emphasis 
on increasing contract management accessions, and intense pressure to cut 
operating budgets has increased the interest in the models available for use by the 
DoD to (1) measure contracting organization workload and (2) assign adequate 
resources to effectively manage the workload with an acceptable level of risk. An 
essential requirement for organizational success is to ensure that the correct number 
of resources, with the correct competencies, is available at the point of need at the 
correct time to accomplish the mission. In order to correctly train and assign 
resources, one must first understand the nature and amount of work to be 
accomplished. This paper finds that contracting workload assessment is not 
conducted in a consistent manner within DoD nor among the various individual 
Service components. In fact, in many organizations, it is not conducted at all.  Seven 
steps that contracting organizations can take to identify contracting workload and 
manage it accordingly are presented. 
Introduction 
This study focuses on identifying methods used to assess the workload of 
government contracting personnel. In its most basic form, this research seeks to move the 
field toward answering the question, “What size should my contracting organization be?” 
The increasing pace of change in the federal acquisition environment, an emphasis on 
increasing contract management accessions, and intense pressure to cut operating budgets 
has increased the interest in the models available for use by the DoD to (1) measure 
contracting organization workload and (2) assign adequate resources to effectively manage 
the workload with an acceptable level of risk. 
An essential requirement for organizational success is to ensure that the correct 
number of resources, with the correct competencies, is available at the point of need at the 
correct time to accomplish the mission. In order to correctly train and assign resources, one 
must first understand the nature and amount of work to be accomplished. Simply stated, a 
leader is unable to effectively deploy resources (which should be step 2) without first 
understanding the work to be done (step 1).  This maxim holds true for leaders, whether 
leading in fast-food restaurants or leading in forward deployed military units.  It also holds 
true for acquisition and contracting organizations. 
Through a review of existing literature and models currently in use by government 
and industry contracting (also sometimes referred to as purchasing/procurement) 
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organizations, I identify a gap between the models and processes available to identify 
workload levels and the models and processes currently used in DoD organizations.    
What is the right size for the organization? I acknowledge at the outset that the 
answer to this quantitative question is not in itself sufficient for organizational success. It is 
not simply the number of workers but also the competencies of those workers that is 
essential in meeting mission requirements. However, competency assessment is not the 
subject of this research. Attempts to measure contracting organization competencies have 
been conducted in the past and are the focus areas of several recent human capital 
planning initiatives. The primary focus of this paper is on the partner of organization 
competency: identifying methods to assess workload in the DoD, Federal Civilian, and other 
commercial contracting organizations, and using that information to staff organizations 
accordingly. 
Literature Review 
A review of the literature revealed that it is conventional wisdom that growth in the 
DoD acquisition workforce is thought to be a necessity (e.g., Acquisition Advisory Panel, 
2007; DoD, 2010; Gansler, 2007). However, while subjective rationale is provided in the 
workforce planning literature, no quantitative basis for specific growth figures was identified. 
The Defense Business Board (2010) provides the broad logic for the growth target: 
Between 2010 and 2015, DoD will grow its DAW [Defense Acquisition Workforce] 
by 20K (from 127K to 147K), more than 15 percent. Ten thousand (10K) of the 
total will be from contractor conversions (insourcing) and 10K will be new hires 
(new billets). This increase will restore the DAW to late 1990s levels and is 
intended to restore core capabilities. (Defense Business Board, 2010, p. 5) 
The rationale conveyed appears to be based on a perception that contracting 
organizations were generally adequately staffed in the mid-1990s. This perception is the 
fundamental basis for establishing the goal to increase the DAW by 20,000. I was unable to 
identify a workload analysis that supported the notion that the staffing levels in the 1990s 
were adequate.  Nor was I able to locate a quantitative analysis for the proposed 20,000 
increase in the DAW.  The lack of an analytical foundation for the increase in the DAW begs 
the following questions: If there is no answer to why 20,000 more positions is the correct 
number for the increase, then how do we know to which Service or buying office the newly 
created positions should be assigned? How do we know which offices are currently 
adequately staffed and which offices are critically understaffed? What will be the most 
effective method to allocate these new positions to the offices with the greatest need? 
In order to answer these questions, the DoD requires a workload assessment model 
and a resource allocation model based on the projected workload of a buying office. While it 
may not be practical to implement a DoD-wide solution, a robust model for each Service, 
major command, or agency should be attainable. The following sections cover the extant 
literature from government and academic sources. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
GAO investigations continue to serve as a reminder of both the distance traveled on 
workforce strategy development, and the miles yet to go. In September 2010, the GAO 
released a report entitled Human Capital: Further Actions Needed to Enhance DoD’s 
Civilian Strategic Workforce Plan. The audit report found that key requirements such as 
identifying funding for training civilian employees, analyzing workforce skill gaps, and 
assessing progress and results have not been fully addressed. The report also indicated 
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that the current DoD plan does not specify the appropriate acquisition workforce makeup 
and has not developed guidance to help program offices meet workforce planning objectives 
(GAO, 2010).  The report cites the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as seeking “an 
appropriately sized cadre of acquisition personnel who have the skills and training 
necessary to successfully perform their jobs” (GAO, 2010, p. 2). However, there is no 
guidance as to what size an appropriately sized cadre should be, nor how to determine the 
appropriate size. 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in the Office of Management and 
Budget was established by Congress in 1974 to provide overall direction for government-
wide procurement policies.  OFPP received a significant report on the acquisition workforce 
in 2007.  The Acquisition Advisory Panel was authorized by Section 1423 of the Services 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2003. The panel was charged to review and recommend any 
necessary changes to acquisition laws and regulations as well as government-wide 
acquisition policies. In the Acquisition Advisory Panel’s resulting report to the OFPP in 2007, 
they found that “without a workforce that is qualitatively and quantitatively adequate and 
adapted to its mission, the procurement reforms of the last decade cannot achieve their 
potential, and successful federal procurement cannot be achieved” (Acquisition Advisory 
Panel, 2007, p. 330). 
Other findings of the panel included that the complexity of the federal acquisition 
system as a whole has markedly increased since the 1980s; that few agencies have 
systematically assessed their acquisition workforce; that procurement obligations grew by 
60% in the past five years; that the qualitative nature of the procurement activity has also 
changed, placing greater demands on the acquisition workforce for capability, training, time, 
and sophistication; and that a significant shift from the acquisition of goods to the acquisition 
of services has occurred, placing additional demands on the acquisition workforce in 
requirements definition, contract formation process, and in contract management 
(Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007). 
The panel also identified the changing nature of contracting processes as having a 
significant impact on the acquisition workforce. For example, the use of interagency awards 
and schedules to meet requirements has often allowed for the timely issuance of 
agreements, which allows a strained workforce to meet customer needs. However, the use 
of these schedules has contributed to other problems occurring from the failure of agencies 
to fully develop requirements, the failure to secure competition in using these vehicles, or 
the failure to manage contract performance under these vehicles (Acquisition Advisory 
Panel, 2007). 
Other findings included the increased complexity involved with utilizing best value 
awards as opposed to lowest price awards and the additional burden of past performance 
assessment prior to award. In addition, the panel also identified that both government-wide 
and agency-specific efforts to respond to the new challenges of today’s acquisition system 
have focused on the nature of the skills required for success in today’s contracting 
environment. They have not ascertained the number of personnel possessing those skills 
that are required given the level of present or future agency acquisition activity (Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 366). 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb==== - 98 -  
=
=
Department of Defense (DoD) 
The DoD recently published the DoD Strategic Human Capital Plan Update—The 
Defense Acquisition Workforce (DoD, 2010). This document is prepared to meet the 
statutory reporting requirements established in multiple National Defense Authorization Acts. 
As such, it provides a tremendous amount of information on workforce demographics and 
strategies. This report provides rationale for increasing the size of the acquisition workforce, 
which is in sync with the perception that the DAW needs to return to mid-90s staffing 
numbers. Specifically, it states, “The increase of approximately 20,000 [employees] will 
rebalance the organic acquisition workforce to better address inherently governmental and 
other critical functions. This will help mitigate the imbalance created by significant 
outsourcing of acquisition functions since the end of the Cold War” (DoD, 2010, p. 2–10). 
The report references several factors supporting an increase in the workforce, including the 
following: 
1. the dramatic increase in annual spend levels since 2001; 
2. the tesults of the Dayton Aerospace SACOM reviews of major program 
offices in the Air Force and Navy and a subsequent Air Force assessment of 
their workforce assigned to major programs;  
3. the DoD competency assessment and bottoms-up review conducted by the 
OSD and component contracting leaders; 
4. the internal DoD analysis of a variety of RAND studies on the acquisition 
workforce; 
5. the numerous external studies, including GAO reports, that recommended the 
DoD increase the size of the acquisition workforce; and  
6. the Defense Acquisition Workforce Structures and Capability review (Section 
814, NDAA FY06). 
These arguments generally convey the contracting leadership message to “send us 
more help” and serve as the basis that an increase in the size of the acquisition workforce 
will contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of mission performance. However, while a 
review of the open-source literature listed above found arguments for increasing the size of 
the acquisition workforce in general, no objective basis for the precise increase of 20,000 
acquisition workforce employees was found. 
RAND 
The RAND Corporation (which is a Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center, FFRDC, for the DoD) is one of the primary organizations that has contributed to the 
literature relevant to acquisition workforce management.  A notable RAND study within its 
National Defense Research Institute is a report titled Civilian Workforce Planning in the 
Department of Defense, published in 2006. The study sought to describe the existing 
workforce planning process at individual military installations in order to identify challenges 
to workforce planning at these bases and to consider options for DoD-wide workforce 
planning and OSD support for installation-level planning. The four basic steps of the model 
developed by the study effort are the following: 
1. forecast workforce requirements (staffing levels and competencies demanded 
in the future), 
2. project workforce supply,  
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3. identify gaps between supply and demand, and  
4. develop strategies that address key gaps. (Gates, Eibner, & Keating, 2006, 
pp. xiv-xv) 
Gates et al. (2006) discovered that unlike some non-governmental agencies with 
fewer manpower restrictions, customer demand is not the only factor that managers must 
consider in assessing DoD workforce demand. 
In the DoD, local managers face constraints on the total number of civilian work 
years they are allowed, as well as the total wage bill for civilian personnel. These 
additional constraints complicate gaps analysis, because local managers must 
be conscious of at least two gaps: that between the required (the estimated 
workforce needed or required to accomplish the organization’s goals) workforce 
and the workforce supply, and that between the budgeted (the workforce that can 
be supported with resources that have been budgeted for civilian personnel in 
that organization) workforce and the workforce supply. (Gates et al., 2006, p. 47)  
A follow-on report (Gates, 2009) found that demand analysis involves two important 
types of data: projections of customer demand and data that allow that demand to be 
translated into workforce requirements. In other words, there must be a set of ratios, 
workload factors, or process times that allow the researcher to interpolate the raw demand 
information into workforce requirements. The researchers found that a lack of data, both on 
the skills and competencies of the workforce and on customer demand, limits workforce 
planning throughout the DoD. The RAND investigation found that given the lack of available 
information on workforce requirements, size, quality, and mix, it was not possible to assess 
whether more workers, more highly skilled workers, or a different mix of workers would 
improve acquisition outcomes (Gates, 2009). 
Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) 
The FAI is assisting with the initial efforts to assess contracting workload in federal 
civilian agencies and has taken a noteworthy leadership position on broad-based 
competency assessment of the DAW. 
In 2007, the FAI issued a report presenting the results of its 2007 Contracting 
Workforce Competencies Survey. The survey targeted the GS-1102 series in the civilian 
agencies, including military personnel working outside the DoD performing contract 
specialist duties. In 2008 the FAI conducted a follow-up competency survey, 2008 
Acquisition Workforce Competencies Survey Results Report and Survey Content, which 
revealed that the average response improved for each of the contracting competency areas 
(as well as for the contracting officer technical representative and for the program manager; 
FAI, 2009). 
The report stated that overall, contracting workforce technical competencies are at 
expected levels. “Of the 17 technical competencies surveyed, gaps requiring attention were 
identified in project management, defining requirements, and financial management. 
General business competency gaps were identified in influencing/negotiating and oral 
communications” (FAI, 2007, p. 2). Personnel working in DoD organizations were not 
surveyed, thus generalizability to the DoD may exist, but is uncertain. 
An objective critique of the FAI competency assessment offers that any time self-
reported competency assessments are conducted, there is the risk of self-report bias and 
assessment inflation. Conducting objective interview- or scenario-based assessments with a 
sample of the population and comparing them to self-assessment scores would provide 
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useful validation baselines regarding the accuracy of the self-reported competency 
assessments. 
In 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy addressed the need for workload 
models in the Acquisition Workforce Development Strategic Plan for Civilian Agencies—FY 
2010–2014 (OFPP, 2009). To assist civilian agencies with preparing workforce plans, the 
OFPP provided project model assistance along with the FAI: 
Because agency missions and acquisition activities differ considerably, there is 
no simple formula that can relate the size and composition of an agency’s 
acquisition activity to its ideal workforce size. In developing a target acquisition 
workforce profile, agencies should examine their current acquisition management 
practices and determine where performance is hindered by insufficient 
resources. In particular, agencies should plan to increase the size of their 
acquisition workforce so long as the cost-savings and performance improvement 
benefits to taxpayers from better acquisition management exceed the cost of the 
additional acquisition employees. Additionally, FAI will develop and maintain an 
online toolkit for use by the agencies that will include various projection 
methodologies that agencies can use as part of their workforce analysis. (OFPP, 
2009, p. 9) 
FAI has since established an online community that shares workload projection tools. 
In keeping with the OFPP’s assessment that the most appropriate model may vary by 
agency, seven different model types have been made available. The models available 
include project-based, program-based, multi-dimensional, regression, volume-based, 
transaction, and conceptual-combination models. The specific characteristics of these 
models will be discussed further in the model analysis section of this article. 
Purchasing Workload Ratios and Measures  
The academic literature offers several studies on purchasing and contracting 
organization workload measures.  In attempting to determine the best overall workload 
measurement method, Monczka and Carter (1978) urged caution when selecting a 
methodology.  They found that aggregate standards (e.g., actions or spend per buyer) were 
preferable to time standards (average time required to complete specific contracting actions) 
because “detailed time standards do not appear to yield results that are sufficiently superior 
in most purchasing departments to justify their development” (Monczka & Carter, 1978, p. 
39).  However, a critique of the actions or spend per buyer methods identifies a significant 
shortcoming: the failure to assess the complexity of the work or the quality of the output. 
In a study of 17 government procurement agencies at the county level, McCampell 
and Slaich (1995) found that two benchmarks provided insight into buying organization 
performance. The first measure is the average dollar volume obligated annually per 
professional staff member (buyer). The second measure is the mean cost per dollar 
obligated (CPDO; McCampbell & Slaich, 1995).  The dollars-per-buyer measure was found 
to be superior to orders- or action-per– buyer measures due to an absence of how an order 
or action was defined from organization to organization. The variability in these definitions 
substantiates the argument that the weights applied to variables should be made at lower 
organizational levels, since agency-wide weights and definitions would not be appropriate or 
reasonable for all contracting organizations within an agency.  Furthermore, this measure 
could be manipulated by pursuing inefficient methods (issuing multiple orders rather than 
pursuing a more efficient, consolidated order process). Auditors may conclude that such a 
reduction in orders may provide a logical basis for staff reductions (McCampbell & Slaich, 
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1995). The study found that the average dollar volume obligated annually was $10.7 million, 
which is in the range found in the CAPS benchmarks ($3.4 million in aerospace to $47.9 
million for food service; McCampbell & Slaich, 1995, 34). 
The CPDO benchmark was found to be particularly useful to the government sector. 
It is based on available information, and it is easy to understand. The authors of this study 
also found that dollar-based calculations would be less likely to cause government auditors 
to mistake increased efficiency (fewer orders) as a cause for staff reductions (McCampbell & 
Slaich, 1995). CPDO would also be of interest to organizations pursuing consolidated 
buying strategies, since larger organizations using centralized or strategic sourcing 
processes are likely to achieve efficiencies in procurement. The limiting factor of applying 
CPDO in such an environment is that strategic sourcing efforts often take a great deal of 
upfront work,  and then these efforts actually serve to reduce total dollars obligated, which 
has a  negative impact on the measure. Another caveat would be to ensure that the 
measure is used in a competitive environment (to ensure award prices are not kept high to 
improve the metric) and in an aggregated fashion, rather than applying the measure to 
individual buyers (aggregation should ensure there is no skewing by individuals attempting 
to pursue “bad buying” practices; McCampbell & Slaich, 1995). The study found that the 
mean CPDO was $0.0104, which is in the range found in the CAPS benchmarks, $0.002 to 
$0.05 (McCampbell & Slaich, 1995, p. 34). 
Also in 1995, Black (1995) developed the Workload Index Model. Black’s model is an 
analytical attempt to compute a workload index that accounts for differences in the types of 
work and in the complexity of the work being performed (Black, 1995). Earlier models 
discussed used dollars obligated or orders processed as the common basis for 
measurement. Black posited that non-weighted  measures such as the average number of 
actions per employee, average dollars  obligated per employee, and average days to 
process an action must be avoided  (Black, 1995). His rationale is that these measures fail 
to account for the relative (weighted) differences in work tasks and staffing across offices 
examined. A small average number of procurements (or dollars) processed per staff 
member does not necessarily indicate poor performance; nor does a large average number 
of procurements (or dollars) processed per staff member necessarily indicate exceptional 
performance (Black, 1995, p. 45). To address this, Black’s model added weighting to the 
output of each worker by their pay level (e.g., GS-11, GS-12, GS-14, etc.). The higher level 
workers are expected to produce higher volume than lower level workers. Black’s model 
improved on other models by addressing the likelihood that the experience composition of 
one group of individuals may be vastly different from a more experienced organization of the 
same size differences.  However, just as one group of twenty contracting professionals is 
not necessarily as equally capable as another group of twenty contracting professionals, 
one GS-14 is not necessarily as capable as another GS-14.  Thus, controlling for wage 
grade alone still provides for a great deal of variability in the model. 
In 2004, a study of procurement benchmarks, combined with the performance of 
organizations at various levels above and below benchmark means, provided interesting 
results (IOMA, 2004). The study ranked firms procurement organizations in two categories: 
efficiency and effectiveness.  The firms were identified as “world class” if they were either (1) 
in the top quartile of both efficiency and effectiveness benchmarks or (2) in the top 10% of 
either of the two benchmarks (IOMA, 2004, p. 7). The study then identified the firms’ cost-
per-dollar-obligated ratios.  Procurement cost as a percentage of spend was 0.72% at world-
class firms in efficiency and effectiveness, compared to the 1.02% overall benchmark. 
Further, this study shed light on the impact of high quantity and quality output by finding that 
the cost-to-spend ratio is 0.92% for firms in the top 10% of effectiveness and 0.32% for 
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those in the top 10% of efficiency (IOMA, 2004, p. 7). Therefore, although it may seem that 
higher quality would require higher cost, it does not appear to be the case, because the 
average world-class firms executed at a lower cost-to-spend (0.92% and 0.32% versus the 
1.02% average).  Other findings from this study include that world-class companies use 
relatively fewer people (54 FTEs per billion dollars spent versus the mean of 104 FTEs per 
billion dollars spent) and that they invest more heavily in technology ($24,308 per FTE as 
compared to the mean of $7,717 per FTE). Finally, world-class organizations shift 
investments and resources to higher value activities (16% of costs spent on order 
processing versus the 22% mean, and 11% of costs to supplier management and 
development versus the 2% mean; IOMA, 2004, p. 7). 
Performance Unit Costing (PUC) 
The review of the literature so far illustrates several methods to measure work and 
performance.  It also identifies a significant absence of quality measures in most models and 
benchmarks. A series of publications (Sorber & Straight, 1989, 1991, 1995; Straight, 1999, 
2000) have made the case for procurement organization evaluation via Performance Unit 
Costing (PUC). This method considers the cost of operations relative to performance units. 
Performance units are completed actions adjusted for the level of the quality of the output. 
Examples of quality factors include timely award, timely delivery, fair and reasonable prices, 
and customer satisfaction (Sorber & Straight, 1995). 
PUC is calculated by multiplying the number of output units (e.g., contract actions) by 
an achieved quality index (from 0.00 to 1) composed of some of the factors above. The 
result is the quantity of performance units. The number of performance units is then divided 
into the operating cost of the procurement organization to determine the cost per 
performance unit (Sorber & Straight, 1995). For example, 900 units of output at an achieved 
quality index of 0.65 yields 585 performance units. If the procurement organization costs 
incurred were 10,000, then the cost per performance unit would be $17.09. Obtaining higher 
output levels while maintaining quality and cost would decrease the performance unit cost. 
Higher quality achieved at the same cost and output would also decrease PUC. Managers 
are provided with the insight that increasing quality factors may increase cost, but they may 
also identify some components of the quality index that can be affected without increasing 
cost, and other quality factors that can be improved to reduce the cost per performance unit. 
The PUC methodology allows managers to move away from single-factor workload 
indicators such as procurement lead time, action quantity, or dollars obligated. It combines 
the resource perspective of the cost to run the organization with the quantity and quality of 
the work performed. The model also has the flexibility to involve customers in determining 
quality measures and their relative weights or importance (Sorber & Straight, 1995). 
The PUC model seems to improve upon the Workload Index Model discussed 
previously by considering the total cost of the operation as the basis for analysis rather than 
the GS levels of the workforce, which are subject to step level gradation variability (all GS-
14s are not the same, nor are they compensated the same). In addition, it allows for 
weighted workload credit depending on variable types of work output, and most important, it 
recognizes that all output is not the same (some work is of better quality than other work; 
Sorber & Straight, 1995). 
The Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies (CAPS) 
CAPS is sponsored by the Institute of Supply Management and works with industry 
supply management executives and academics to develop and share knowledge and best 
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practices. It conducts recurring surveys and publishes regular reports on key areas of 
procurement and supply management. These publications allow commercial purchasing 
organizations to compare themselves with other organizations at a macro level as well as 
with organizations within their industry sector. Based on surveys of procurement 
organizations, the CAPS provides a snapshot overview of 20 different key performance 
indicators (Wade, 2010). Among the 20 industry variables that the CAPS tracks related to 
procurement, there are 11 that apply to both the public and private sectors: 
1. The total dollars spent by a procurement organization as a percent of total 
firm budget (how much of an organization’s needs are acquired via contract, 
and what is procurement’s relative impact/importance to the total 
organization); 
2. Supply management operating expense as a percent of total spend (how 
much does it cost to spend each dollar of supplies or services that the 
organization procures); 
3. Total spend per supply management employee (contract dollars awarded by 
the average procurement specialist); 
4. Supply management operating expense per supply management employee 
(the total cost—pay, training, benefits, etc.—of the average member of the 
workforce); 
5. Annual spend on professional training per supply management employee; 
6. Professional training hours completed per supply management employee; 
7. Supply management group retention rate; 
8. Cost reduction savings as a percent of total spend; 
9. Cost avoidance savings as a percent of total spend; 
10. Average order/action processing cost; and 
11. Average cycle-time (in days) from requirement approval to issuance of 
order/contract. (Institute of Supply Management, 2010) 
This list of benchmarks presents an immediate opportunity for contracting leaders to 
identify those benchmarks that measure key performance areas linked to their organization 
goals.  Assessing organization performance in the identified areas and comparing the 
performance results to the benchmarks will allow leaders to identify the current level of 
performance, the trends in performance over time, and the establishment of organization 
performance goals. 
While the applicability and usefulness of these benchmarks will vary among 
organizations, the first three benchmarks should be of particular interest to all DoD 
contracting organizations.  Item 1 allows leaders to convey contracting’s contribution to the 
Service’s mission; Item 2 allows a comparison to other organizations on the efficiency of the 
unit; and Item 3 identifies the size of the portfolio that the average buyer can execute.  
These ratios can provide insight into workload execution and actionable information for 
contracting leaders. 
Some of the interesting benchmarks in the 2006 CAPS report showed that the supply 
management operating expense per employee was $107,803. It is important to note that 
operating expenses per employee are calculated in different ways depending on the firm, 
but the measure always includes employee salary at a minimum (IOMA, 2006, p. 18).  Given 
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the difficulty in collecting operating expense data in some DoD organizations, establishing 
salary as the employee expense metric may allow for the creation of a simplified and 
consistent measure between organizations. 
The successful application of CAPS benchmarks in a federal agency contracting 
organization is illustrated in the workload assessment conducted in 2004 at the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS; Sorber & Bodnar, 2004).  The high-level DHS staffing analysis 
of procurement resources was conducted to facilitate the largest government reorganization 
in U.S. history. The analysis consisted of a cost-to-spend ratio analysis using FY 2002 total 
obligations and salary expense. The study also calculated spend-per-employee using total 
obligations and number of employees. It compared the findings to benchmarks published by 
the CAPS. The study found that the DHS buying offices’ cost-to-spend ratios ranged from 
0.20% to 2.28% with a mean of 1.06%. The study used cost-to-spend ratios available from 
other federal buying offices for comparison. The comparison ratios ranged from 0.71% at 
NASA–Goddard and 0.86% at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
to 2.31% at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The mean of comparison agency 
cost-to-spend was 1.35%. The CAPS benchmark for mean cost-to-spend in the aerospace 
industry is 2.21%. The DHS compared favorably in both range and mean relative to the 
benchmark and comparison agency cost-to-spend ratios (Sorber & Bodnar, 2004). 
When looking at spend-per-employee, DHS organizations ranged from $2.8 million to 
$44 million with a $12.4 million mean. Comparison agencies ranged from $3 million to $8.9 
million and had a mean spend-per-employee of $6 million. The DHS had a higher average 
and a much wider range of spend-per-employee than the comparison agencies. By 
comparison, the CAPS benchmark mean for aerospace industry procurement was $5.3 
million.  The researchers then considered the upcoming planned FY 2004 obligations to 
calculate FTEs required. By dividing the planned obligations by the $5.3 million and the $6 
million agency and industry benchmarks, the researchers identified a range of imputed FTEs 
appropriate for meeting the projected contracting office workload. 
However, since the researchers calculated average spend-per-employee as $12.4 
million, it seems that $12.4 million would have served as a reasonable estimate, rather than 
the $5.3–$6 million estimate that was used in the study. The larger number could have at 
least been used to illustrate an alternative position with a slightly higher risk associated with 
it, should the DHS have wished to accept that risk. Given that the factor is double the 
benchmarks used, the argument for accepting some risk beyond $6 million spend-per-
employee would be warranted. Using the lower risk benchmarks, the authors identified a 
requirement for 220 FTEs. When factored with the average DHS procurement salary of 
$150,650 (the planning average salary provided by the DHS), the result was a FTE budget 
of $32.9 million. Given that this is the lowest risk profile, $32.9 million should be considered 
the maximum possible FTE budget. 
An interesting further finding of the study was the identification of the fees charged 
by agencies (such as GWACs, GSA, GovWorks, etc.) for performing contracting work for the 
DHS. The fees ranged from 0.75% to 8%. The researchers calculated an average fee of 
2.5% and used it to illustrate the cost that would be incurred if requirements were sent to 
outside agencies for obligation. The researchers found that applying a 2.5% average fee to 
the projected obligation total for FY 2004 would result in $43.5 million in fees. When 
compared to the worst-case FTE budget of $32.9 million, it is clear that use of outside 
agencies should be minimized in this example. However, for organizations with cost-to-
spend ratios above 2.5%, a compelling argument for seeking outside support could be 
made. While the DHS study provides a great deal of insight into procurement workforce 
evaluation, it should also provide motivation for procurement leaders to ask, “What is my 
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cost-to-spend ratio?”, if for no other reason than to better understand the implications of 
using outside procurement organizations. 
Contracting Organization Workload Models 
Given the significant number of new workers expected to be hired by DoD 
contracting organizations in the next several years, leaders are now presented with a 
tremendous opportunity to determine the optimum method of apportioning resources and 
measuring performance. A review of workload and performance measures used by various 
contracting organizations is presented in the following section. 
Army Workload Models 
The Army has primarily relied on a decentralized workload assessment process.  
This process allows the various commands to develop workload models for application 
within their organizations. 
Perhaps the best developed workload model has been developed by the U.S. Army 
Material Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA). The AMSAA has been tasked with preparing 
manpower models for Army acquisition organizations since 1987. In 1999, the Army Material 
Command directed the AMSAA to baseline all functional areas in the acquisition process, 
including program management, staff/policy support, and contract administration. The model 
developed as a result of this baseline was finalized in 2002. Two clusters developed based 
on the types of work accomplished: weapon system acquisition and installation/camp 
support. Different process action times (PATs) or task completion times were used in each 
of the two sectors (J. Henderson, personal communication, May 4, 2010). An example of the 









The primary workload factors used in the AMSAA model are (1) contract actions, (2) 
solicitations, (3) the ratio of competitive to non-competitive actions, and (4) the number of 
acquisition systems managed. An interesting aspect of this model is the weighting applied to 
completive actions. Based on a regression analysis of actions processed, the AMSAA has 
assigned a 4.5 multiplier to non-competitive (e.g., sole source) contract actions. In other 
words, a non-competitive action is credited for 4.5 times the process action time allowed for 
completion when compared with a competitive action (J. Henderson, personal 
communication, May 4, 2010). The last complete model run was in 2006; however, high-
level assessments for the ACC as a whole have been accomplished since then. 
Air Force Workload Models 
In 2001, the Air Force published a manpower standard (AFMS) for operational 
contracting (AFMIA, 2001). Operational contracting focuses on meeting the needs of airmen 
at the base or installation level, as opposed to systems contracting, which focuses on 
developing and acquiring major weapons systems such as aircraft.  The AFMS recognizes 
key workload indicators such as dollars obligated and total actions completed. It also 
recognizes that large-dollar actions are more complex than small-dollar actions, and as 
such, rewards more process time credit for actions above $100,000 than for those below 
$100,000.  The model recognizes the impact of expeditionary deployments on an 
organization and has a mechanism for awarding manpower for such activity. It also 
recognizes the importance of the support roles of the contracting organization, and it awards 
manpower for Government Purchase Card (GPC) oversight, small business program 
administration, commander’s support staff, and IT support. The process time standards were 
developed by recognizing over 150 individual types of activity in the procurement process 
and at least 50 types of activity in the contingency contracting environment (AFMIA, 2001). 
As such, it is one of the most thorough contracting manpower models produced. The 
manpower standard workload formulas can be inserted into standard spreadsheet software 
applications for ease of computation. However, the parsing of data required to translate 
existing data into a useable format (e.g., the elimination of non-qualifying contract activity) 
can be burdensome. 
Because the Air Force model is more robust in many ways when compared to other 
agency models, it has been favored as the model of choice by many in non-Air Force DoD 
agencies and has become the default model used in joint basing workload transfer 
negotiations.  Despite the praise this model has received from many users, criticism for the 
standard has grown in recent years. Of particular note is that the manpower formula is 
outdated because it is based on the mean (or average) time for executing activities in 1998. 
As identified in the literature review, actions have become more complex and time-
consuming to execute in the past 12 years, and the number of complex contract actions has 
increased while less complex actions have decreased, and have often shifted to GPCs. An 
example of the Air Force Operational Contracting Model is depicted in Figure 2. 
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Furthermore, critics assert that the manpower formula does not reflect the 
complexities of today’s business processes such as the Management and Oversight  of 
Acquisition of Services Process (MOASP), the Performance-Based Service  Contracts, the 
Standard Procurement System, the competitive sourcing for multiple installation support, the 
increased post-award contract administration burden of service contracts on installation 
contracting offices, the strategic sourcing efforts which require much more pre-award activity 
in order to develop commodity strategies, and the increased contingency deployments.  In 
addition, the types of work that receive no credit in the Air Force model are a concern for 
many. For example, there is no credit given for dollars obligated or actions processed that 
are modifications to contracts, nor for processing orders off of centralized contracts, nor for 
awarding or processing utility contracts. The work associated with these efforts can be 
substantial, yet it is not credited in the Air Force model. The rationale for withholding credit is 
that post-award and order processing was “built in” to the original time standards. In other 
words, in the manpower standard, when you are given credit for awarding a contract, you 
also earn all the necessary manpower to administer the contract. Given the changes in 
complexity and number of these types of actions since 1998, and the tremendous growth in 
multi-year contracts (which were much more rare in 1998), it calls into question whether the 
original built-in process times are still an accurate reflection of the actual time required to 
complete the activities today. A final critique of the Air Force model is that it is perceived to 
be similar to the time and motion studies conducted in the mid-twentieth century. Time and 
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motion studies focus on increasing the efficiency in a process and measuring the time 
required to complete tasks. Although the models measure the time required to accomplish 
process tasks, they do not take into account the quality of the outputs that result from the 
process. 
Separate and distinct from the Air Force operational manpower standard is the Air 
Force Workload Assessment Model (WAM) for weapon systems contracting developed by 
the Aeronautical System Center (ASC) at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. This model relies on 
stakeholder assessments of the number of hours required for tasks at differing dollar 
thresholds. For example, an organization may earn 245 hours to complete a sole source 
contract from $1 million to $5 million but earn 575 hours to complete a contract from $25 
million to $50 million. Similar threshold-based earned hours are awarded in service contract, 
competitive contract, and delivery order categories as well. In all, there are 49 differing 
actions that organizations can earn credit for. There are 16 modification types (supplemental 
agreements, funding actions, etc.), 10 undefinitized contract types (letter contracts, 
terminations, option exercises, etc.), 15 definitization actions (task order, delivery order, 
undefinitized contract action [UCA] definititization, etc.), and eight miscellaneous actions 
(Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] requests, congressional inquiries, etc.). Stakeholder 
groups meet to assign process times for each of these types of work (D. Baker, personal 
communication, March 22, 2010). 
 
Figure 3 
Workload is determined through an annual data call exercise in which each buyer 
(with workload) on the installation (approximately 700) completes a spreadsheet by simply 
identifying the contract or program they are working on and then identifying, via dropdown 
boxes, each of the actions they (1) accomplished in the past three months and (2) are 
scheduled to complete in the coming three months (see the WAM model example in Figure 
 =
=




3). The assigned hours “earned” are not displayed to the buyers, and all workload 
assessment computations are calculated after submission. The data are aggregated through 
contracting offices and reviewed by contracting leaders so that they can concur with the 
input (D. Baker, personal communication, March 22, 2010).  The data are further refined by 
assigning earned credit based on where the action is within the acquisition cycle. In other 
words, buyers earn partial credit for completing any of the 12 different portions of larger 
tasks of work in progress (e.g., 25% of related task hours for reaching RFP issued, or 70% 
for negotiations complete). Further refinements occur based on the complexity factor 
assigned to the program office. Through stakeholder discussions, factors such as 
congressional visibility, program maturity, higher headquarters or PEO review thresholds, 
technical complexity, personnel mix and history, etc., are considered, and an indirect 
multiplier factor from 0.1 to 0.4 can be added to the workload input to compensate for 
additional workload due to program complexity (D. Baker, personal communication, March 
22, 2010). 
A weakness of WAM is that it requires a manual data call once a year and a periodic 
validation by stakeholders of the earned hours attributed to workload types.  It also relies on 
individual procurement specialists to accurately input their workload, determine the 
appropriate complexity level for the work, and determine the degree of completion of the 
total effort. In addition, it does not account for types or grades of workforce personnel. Forty 
hours earned through an action covers one FTE for a week, whether it is a GS-9 with two 
years of experience or a GS-13 with twenty years of experience. To account for this, if a 
contracting office has a significant departure from the normal distribution of grade levels, the 
indirect complexity factor is designed to compensate for that shortfall. 
Navy Workload Models 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) uses the Time to Produce (TTP) 
workload model to measure work accomplished. The model was originally developed by the 
Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Norfolk at their Philadelphia location. The model uses 
PATs developed by two subject matter expert groups (representing simplified acquisitions 
and large acquisitions). The TTP model relies on data collected each month on completed 
actions. The data set includes product and service definitions of the action. The data are 
placed into simplified or large acquisition buckets. The headcount for the actions is tracked 
at the FISC level.   
A separate productivity model measures the actual productivity of the contracting 
specialists via a tally of simplified and large contract actions completed.  Complexity is 
accounted for in this model by placing more complex actions in the “large acquisition” 
bucket, irrespective of the dollar level (S. Pierce, personal communication, May 7, 2010). 
Both the TTP model and the productivity model can be used to assess activity at the FISC-
wide level, at the aggregate FISC level, or at the individual operating location. Due to the 
wide variability in average productivity per year and the wide variability in the nature of work 
performed, the models are best used to compare year over year performance trends at 
individual locations rather than to assess each location’s capability relative to other locations 
(S. Pierce, personal communication, May 7, 2010). An example of the TTP model is 
depicted in Figure 4. 
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Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Model 
Today the DCMA uses the Performance Labor Accounting System, or PLAS, to 
capture work performed. The PLAS requires DCMA personnel to track their hours on a daily 
basis and attribute them to a program or contract. Much like a timecard system, the PLAS 
allows the DCMA to track the hours and processes performed in support of specific 
contracts and aggregates information into multiple reports, including types of contracts 
supported, agencies supported, processes performed, etc. 
The PLAS can also be used to calculate relative efficiency level comparisons 
between operating locations. (D. Peterson, personal communication, April 20, 2010). The 
PLAS also allows calculations for earned value management in different functional areas. 
The PLAS feeds information into the DCMA’s Enterprise Planning system, which allows the 
agency to calculate the projected workload, as well as the type of support environment (e.g., 
pre-contract activity, post-award activity, contingency activity, etc.) and, as a result, the 
workforce required (R. Sawlsville, personal communication, March 30, 2010). 
The PLAS is a rich source of information for DCMA leaders. Its ability to capture 
actual touch times required to administer contracts is useful. The DCMA has assisted other 
organizations in baselining their workload by providing PLAS data on process times. 
However, some say that navigating through its 100 process codes and hundreds of contract 
numbers is not particularly user-friendly. The difficult interface is suspected of reducing the 
accuracy of information collected because the system relies on buyers to seek out contract 
types and process codes on a daily basis. If buyers perceive the interface to be too 
complicated and utilize the system option to reproduce yesterday’s entry as today’s input, 
then this eventuality serves as a threat to data accuracy. 
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Federal Civilian Agency (FAI) Models 
As discussed in the literature review, the Federal Acquisition Institute has been 
tasked with developing a community of practice and sharing workload models utilized by 
federal civilian agency contracting offices. The FAI has made seven different models 
available for agencies to use to develop workload assessments. 
1. Project-Based Combined Model developed by the Department of Energy. 
This model identifies staffing needs based on project-level characteristics. 
These characteristics include the annual value of project work to be 
executed, the type of project, the project complexity, the manner of execution, 
the project phase, the level of regulatory involvement, and the degree of 
external influence.  
2. Multidimensional Model being developed by the Department of Veterans 
Affairs. The model focuses on tasks in acquisition planning and pre-award 
and post-award activities.   
3. Program-Based Model from the Department of Transportation–Federal 
Aviation Administration. The model uses historical program data to derive 
recommended staffing levels for major acquisition programs.  
4. Regression model that provides two options to the user.  Option one is to 
baseline agency spend to FY 2000. The model indicates that one contract 
specialist is required for each $5 million in spend. In option two, the 
regression model indicates that for each 45 contracts awarded, one additional 
GS-1102 FTE is required. This model is very limited in application and does 
not consider complexity factors.   
5. Volume-Based Surge Tool developed for use as a result of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The model allows the use of agency work 
volume growth from a baseline spend year and can be refined through 
human capital planning and analysis.  
6. Transaction Model based on agency procurement spend and contract 
manager staff counts from 2000–2008. The model requires input of actual 
spend and workforce for each year. An average productivity per contract 
manager over the eight-year period is computed and divided into current FY 
projected spend.  
7. Conceptual Combination Model developed by the FAI.  This model appears 
to be the most thoroughly developed of the seven options. It is agency-
specific and requires agencies to identify complexity, risk, workforce 
productivity, and other elements. Agencies can adjust weights ratios and 
factors to better represent the agency operating environment. The model 
uses a baseline workforce factor of $15.8 million for the average productivity 
of contract managers.  Of note is that the model uses a factor calculated for 
the years 1993–1996 as a time period in which contracting offices were 
considered optimally staffed for contracting professionals. 
All Federal Civilian Agencies have a contracting representative member of the FAI 
modeling working group that can provide access to the various models. The DoD does not 
have a similar working group to facilitate the sharing of model information. 
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Conclusions and Steps for Contracting Leaders 
This study finds that procurement workforce performance measurement and 
workload assessment have been areas of study for at least 70 years. There is a wide variety 
of benchmarks and models available to serve as the basis for government models. 
However, the review of the government organization literature indicates that the question of 
workload assessment has been given significantly less attention than output measurement, 
and that output measurement has been conducted primarily with overly broad measures 
such as dollars obligated and actions completed.  Further, the preponderance of the 
workforce modeling activity is now focusing on (1) measuring the size of the organization 
(impacts of retirement, accessions, etc.), (2) measuring the descriptive statistics or 
demographics of the workforce, and, to a lesser degree, (3) attempting to measure the 
capabilities of the organization vis-à-vis competency assessments (Lamm & Reed, 2009). 
While these assessments present leaders with important pieces of information, they are 
incapable of answering the critical question: How much work will we need to do? 
Understanding the competencies and capabilities of an organization assists managers in 
developing a “mixed” human capital strategy; however, the literature indicates that leaders 
cannot determine the mix of capabilities required without also determining the number of 
workers needed. The two variables affect each other with such great significance that to 
consider one in the absence of the other is an endeavor destined for failure. 
This study and extant literature (e.g., Reed, 2010) have found that workload 
measurement in DoD contracting organizations is either performed inconsistently or not at 
all.  Contracting leaders can take immediate steps to begin measuring workload and 
assigning staffing appropriately based on workload. Multiple models, ratios, and processes 
have been presented in this article, and one or more may present opportunities for your 
organization. However, based on my evaluation of the literature and current processes, the 
following seven steps can be taken at the lowest implementation cost to provide leaders with 
immediate assessment of their workload and staffing. 
1. Define your strategic intent and identify quality measures that reflect your 
intent (timely award, timely delivery, fair and reasonable prices, customer 
satisfaction, corrective actions, etc.). 
2. Conduct a cost-per-dollar-obligated (CPDO) analysis for the previous fiscal 
year for your organization.  If you do not have access to all operating 
expenses (many leaders do not), use the salary cost of the workforce as your 
operating cost. If salary cost is not available, contact your personnel office to 
determine the average “burdened” compensation and support cost for your 
organization, or for the various grade levels of personnel in your organization, 
and compute a rolled-up salary cost. The more exact that you can be when 
determining cost, the better; however, the consistency of your agency’s 
approach from organization to organization and year to year is the most 
critical concern. 
3. Conduct a similar CPDO analysis for the past three years to determine the 
trend for your organization and to establish an average CPDO. 
4. Measure the quality of your outputs (consistent with your strategic intent) now 
and over time to determine trends and averages. 
5. Compare your organization to industry benchmarks, and to similar 
organizations in your Service or Department.  Address the differences 
between your CPDO and the benchmarks.  What are the potential 
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explanations for the differences? What can you do to address the 
differences? If your CPDO is significantly lower than benchmarks and 
comparable organizations, determine the explanatory factors.  A relatively low 
CPDO may indicate your organization is extremely efficient, or perhaps 
indicate that opportunities to enhance quality may exist if more resources 
were added to your team. 
6. Set CPDO and quality goals for your organization. 
7. Identify the estimate of your future work. This remains one of the most difficult 
tasks.  Budget proposals, Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM), and appropriations legislation may provide 
information upon which to construct rough order estimates on either the total 
amount or departure trend from previous year obligations that your 
organization may experience.  Develop complexity and risk assessment 
weights based on the type of monetary obligations, and product/service mix 
that your organization is projected to procure. 
Taking these seven steps will not only provide contracting leaders with valuable 
insight into the amount and nature of the work their organization is to perform, but also 
information regarding the actual performance of the work.  Further, it will allow for the 
development of quality measures linked to the leader’s strategic intent and allow for the 
establishment of quality performance goals for the organization, rather than the volume 
performance measures currently in use. 
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